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Abstract 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is characterized by both maladaptive thinking and 
problematic schemas. Kramer and colleagues (2011) showed that using the motive-oriented 
therapeutic relationship (MOTR), based on the individualized understanding of the patient 
according to Plan Analysis (Caspar, 2007), can improve treatment outcomes for BPD. The 
present process-outcome pilot study aimed to examine the effects of the motive-oriented 
therapeutic relationship on the cognitive biases of patients with BPD. Change in biased 
cognitions in N = 10 patients who were subject to MOTR was compared to that of N = 10 
patients who received psychiatric-psychodynamic treatment (Gunderson & Links, 2008). 
Results show a greater decrease in over-generalizations in patients who received MOTR, 
compared to the patients who received the psychiatric-psychodynamic treatment. These 
changes were related to outcome in various ways. These findings underline the importance of 
an individualized case formulation method in bringing about therapeutic change. 
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CHANGE IN BIASED THINKING IN THE EARLY SESSIONS OF A TREATMENT FOR 
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER: FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE MOTIVE-
ORIENTED THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP 
Relational techniques, i.e., therapeutic techniques focusing and using the therapeutic 
relationship (Smith, Barrett, Benjamin, & Barber, 2006), optimally take into account the 
dialogical nature of psychotherapy (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2004), implying that both 
participants in the interaction may have a momentary influence on each other. This can be 
understood to reflect therapist responsiveness (Stiles, 2009; Stiles, Honos-Webb, & Surko, 
1998), which implies that it is difficult for the therapist to adhere to a manual, even if this is 
what the therapist reports doing (Stiles et al., 1998). This problem has motivated researchers 
to define procedures consistent with the challenge of therapist responsiveness in 
psychotherapy (Caspar & Grosse Holtforth, 2009). One possible operationalization is the Plan 
Analysis concept and the ensuing therapist Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship 
(MOTR; Grawe, 1980, 1992; Caspar, 2007). In a recent recommendation for the treatment of 
patients presenting with Personality Disorders (PD), Gaebel and Falkai (2009; also Herpertz, 
2008) suggested that the Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship may be particularly 
relevant as a relational technique for the treatment of this patient population. 
Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship 
 Plan Analysis, an integrative method of case formulation based on the works of Grawe 
and Dziewas (Grawe, 1980), has been developed further by Caspar (2007). In several ways, it 
may be paralleled with what the Mount Zion group has called the Plan Formulation method 
(Curtis & Silberschatz, 2007) and, in a different way, with the Core Conflictual Relationship 
Theme by Luborsky and Barrett (2007; Jarry, 2010); also, case formulation was shown to be 
particularly important in the domain of Personality Disorders (Dimaggio & Attina, 2012). 
Plans, as defined originally by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960), and written in the upper 
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case to emphasize that its meaning deviates from the common meaning, connect concrete 
patient behaviors or experiences to purposes or motives “behind” visible or intrapsychic 
actions. The underlying assumption is that those behaviors survive and become part of a 
relatively stable repertoire, which are instrumental in the sense of presenting an advantage for 
an individual, conscious or not, which does not necessarily imply that they are adaptive from 
a larger perspective. One behavior may serve several Plans; Plans are organized in an 
instrumental hierarchy, with situation-specific Plans – which are close to behavior – on the 
bottom to the highest general motives, corresponding to psychological needs. These are, 
although with varying weights, similar across patients (i.e., the needs for companionship, 
intimacy or autonomy). In the concrete analysis, the therapist must determine “Which 
conscious or unconscious purposes underlie a particular aspect of an individual’s behavior or 
experience?” or, from a top-down perspective “What means does the patient use to achieve a 
specific goal?” (Caspar, 2007, p. 251). In this context, Plans are closely related to emotions 
and cognitions, as mental activities related to the treatment of person-relevant contents. A 
particular function of adaptive - versus biased - cognitions is to deliver the premises on which 
Plans develop. For example, the belief that “others will reject or abandon me if I’m less than 
perfect” would be the cognitive underpinning of a Plan such as “be perfect”, whereas the 
more profound motive behind this Plan might be related to “be accepted” or “be close to 
others”, suggesting that there is a fear of rejection or of abandonment implied in this 
functioning. A second important type of relation between Plans and cognitions is that Plans 
can serve the purpose of protecting and maintaining convictions. For example, a Plan such as 
“avoid situations in which you could fail and be confronted to your mediocrity” serves the 
purpose of maintaining the conviction of being perfect. Cognitive biases are here formal 
process (as opposed to content) aspects of beliefs or schemas as cognitive underpinnings of 
Plans. The latter relate with motives and fundamental needs in an instrumental fashion. Case 
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conceptualizations based on Plan Analysis rely on an individualized perspective of the 
patient’s functioning, but there are prototypical examples for a variety of mental disorders, 
including Borderline Personality Disorder (e.g., Berthoud, Kramer, de Roten, Despland & 
Caspar, in press) and depression (Caspar, 2007) which facilitate and speed up the 
individualized inductive therapist inferences. Plan Analysis differs from other standardized 
case conceptualization procedures in its individualized methodology, without any pre-set 
categorical system suggesting contents, and in its particular emphasis on relationship 
heuristics called the Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship. 
 Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship (MOTR) is a concept related to the 
planning and implementation of therapist interventions on relationship and process levels of 
psychotherapy. The concept involves two assumptions: (1) Even the most problematic patient 
interpersonal behavior can be related to motives that are not problematic, i.e., not impeding 
therapy. (2) If a therapist has understood these motives and is able to satisfy them sufficiently 
and in a proactive way, the patient has what he or she needs. The use of problematic means is 
thus no longer necessary, and resources and attention can be directed towards problem solving 
(as opposed to struggling in the therapeutic relationship). As these interventions are based on 
the individualized understanding of the patient’s functioning based on Plan Analysis, the 
MOTR is always a custom-tailored, highly individualized intervention. It is often crucial to 
address patient needs in a highly specific manner, as opposed to giving attention to all needs. 
The therapist behavior should be proactive and not be reactive contingently to problematic 
patient behavior. If the therapist’s understanding is accurate, and the deducted therapist 
behavior appropriate, then problematic interpersonal behaviors, in particular interpersonal 
hostility, interpersonal avoidance behaviors, (para-) suicidal behaviors aiming to mobilize the 
therapist outside of office hours and repetitive complaints with regard to insufficient therapist 
activity should decrease. Along with this decrease in problematic interpersonal patterns, it can 
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be believed that a decrease in the pervasiveness of problematic cognitive-affective structures 
underlying such Plans may be found. Grawe (1998; 2004) suggested that repeated need 
satisfaction and resource activation – in an individualized fashion consistent with MOTR - in 
early treatment sessions may have an impact on cognitive structures. Using a neurobiological 
metaphor and within his Consistency Theory, Grawe (2004) postulated that psychotherapy 
based on MOTR-principles should help create novel connections within the brain by 
repeatedly activating the approach- (as opposed to avoidance-) based regulatory systems, by 
producing in-session corrective implicit-relational experience with the therapist. Change in 
cognitive-affective structures, of which biased thinking is a discourse marker, may be viewed 
as a mediator of change in these treatments. 
For example, a female patient with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) and 
presenting the typical assumption “all close relationships are abusive” (see Pretzer, 1990; 
Arntz, Dietzel, & Dreessen, 1999; Arntz, 1994) - which may be coded as negative over-
generalizing - tells the therapist in an assertive way: “I want to stop treatment, because I am 
doing well now!”, based on the implicit assumption “if I stay in therapy, the therapist will 
abuse me.” Behind this specific interactional behavior, the Plans may be “show the therapist 
that you are well”, “avoid engaging more fully in therapy”, “maintain a distance with the 
therapist”. Possible motives behind the latter Plans may involve both “remain in control”  
(distance towards others may refer to the underlying need for control) and “stay close to 
others” (self-presentation as being well may imply to avoid seeing negative aspects, but also 
relate to the basic needs of accepting relationship and sound attachment; see also Drapeau and 
Perry, 2009, for typical interpersonal patterns related to this patient population). A therapist 
who stops treatment simply based on the content of the patient’s utterings would not act 
according to these latter motives. In contrast, a therapist using MOTR would verbally and 
non-verbally reassure the patient that even if she sees much progress, the therapist continues 
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to be there for her while proactively assuring that she is allowed to take control over the 
themes discussed in session. Such an intervention, facing an activated Plan “show the 
therapist that you are well”, may look like this: “I can see that you made much progress. I 
want you to know that if there is a subject you feel that I can help you even more, I will do it 
with every means I have.” 
 These interventions aim at producing a novel corrective experience in the patient 
which contradicts the underlying assumption (i.e., “all close relationships are abusive”) and 
therefore, the pervasiveness of the cognitive structures may be changed. Note that we referred 
to an example from a BPD-patient, but the MOTR-principle presented applies to all forms of 
psychological disorders. It also becomes clear that MOTR clearly goes beyond simply “being 
positive” or “focus on resources” in the patient, as so-called “positive” aspects are also 
understood within the hierarchy of Plans and might be  underpinned by problematic higher-
order Plans. Differentiated complementarity in this particular case focuses on the underlying, 
higher-order, motives and advocates non-complementarity to all lower-order levels, including 
the apparently positive aspect. The example given (i.e., the uttering “I want to stop treatment, 
I am well” extraneous of its context could be understood as marker of positive change) speaks 
to this argument. 
Empirical evidence of the effects of motive-oriented therapeutic relationship 
A number of these assumptions have been tested empirically. Caspar, Grossmann, 
Unmüssig and Schramm (2005) have shown that the non-verbal component of MOTR – 
therapist behavior assuring on non- or para-verbal levels the underlying activated motive - is 
particularly linked with therapeutic outcome in a sample of depressed inpatients (N = 22) 
undergoing interpersonal psychotherapy. Similar results were found by Kramer, Rosciano, 
and colleagues (2011) with outpatients presenting with depression and co-morbid personality 
disorders (N = 20) and undergoing a short form of psychodynamic psychotherapy. According 
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to this study, these conclusions apply to patients with co-morbid personality disorder (PD), 
but no effect was found for patients presenting with major depression alone. Schmutz, Berger 
and Caspar (2011) presented findings showing that MOTR is tied to outcome (N = 162), in 
particular for a sub-sample presenting with PD features (n = 27). Schmitt and colleagues 
(2003) have shown that training in Plan Analysis in students in psychosomatic medicine has 
positive effects on the quality of clinical competencies. Finally, in a recently published pilot 
study of an ongoing randomized controlled trial, we showed that MOTR, applied to a ten-
session treatment for Borderline Personality Disorder, as compared to a control treatment, 
produced significant effects for change in interpersonal problem areas, in the therapeutic 
alliance and in the quality of the therapeutic relationship (N = 25; Kramer, Berger, Kolly, 
Marquet, Preisig, de Roten, Despland, & Caspar, 2011). The study included ten sessions of 
active treatment (if indicated, more treatment was proposed to these patients, but was not 
assessed in this study); indeed, MOTR appears to produce its optimal effects in the early 
phase of therapy, in particular when working with patients presenting with Personality 
Disorders (Caspar & Ecker, 2008; Gaebel & Falkai, 2009; Kramer, 2009; Schmutz et al. 
2011). Therefore, it seems sensible to further explore the effects of MOTR in these early 
sessions of therapy, in particular its effect on cognitive processing. 
Cognitive Processing in Borderline Personality Disorder 
 There is a dearth of research with regards to the patient’s processes potentially 
bringing about change in these interpersonal problems in Borderline Personality Disorder. 
One factor that may influence outcome is the patient’s cognitive and affective in-session 
processing of relevant contents. Biased thinking has been thought as being one factor 
contributing to personality pathology, together with poor abilities in appraising in a mature 
and nuanced way the mind of the others. Such a compromised ability to make sense of the 
others’ mind makes it hard to correct baised attributions of negative intentions to others 
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(Dimaggio, Semerari, Carcione, Procacci, & Nicolo, 2009; Ghiassi, Dimaggio, & Brüne, 
2010; Kendall & Hollon, 1981). Traditionally (Beck, 1963; Arntz, 2005; Pretzer, 1990), 
cognitive errors are believed to be associated with psychopathology; those errors are expected 
to decrease over the course of treatment. More recently, research on heuristics (Gigerenzer & 
Brighton, 2011) has suggested that biased thinking may produce adaptive behavior under 
certain circumstances; thus cognitive errors are – to some extent - part of adaptive human 
functioning (Baron, 2008). An example of this can be found in Mind-reading, a cognitive 
error according to Beck (1963; Beck, 1995), which overlaps to some extent with the 
therapeutic function of mentalization, implying an elaborate theory of mind with regard to the 
other’s functioning (Liotti & Gilbert, 2011). Under certain circumstances, the production of a 
discourse about the other’s intentions, even if perceived negatively, may be adaptive; in other 
contexts, it functions as a cognitive error.  
With regards to patients presenting with BPD, Dimaggio, Semerari, Carcione, 
Procacci and Nicolo (2006) postulated that the specific heuristic “better safe than sorry”, 
representing an overestimation of an anticipated danger and therefore not choosing a limited 
risk (whilst ignoring negative consequences of this absence of choice), was associated with 
this patient population. Furthermore, self-enhancement heuristics, limited anticipation of 
satisfaction, interpersonal reassurance seeking and the restricted ability to feel joy were 
discussed in relation with narcisstistic personality disorder and BPD (Dimaggio et al., 2002; 
Dimaggio et al., 2006; Leahy, 2002). Based on this position, maladaptive heuristics are 
complex structures of a set of individual cognitive errors (i.e., the heuristic “better safe than 
sorry” includes such cognitive errors as catastrophizing and discounting the negative 
information) which together impact the individual’s adaptive ability. It is a set of biases, along 
with their mutual interactions, that influence psychopathology and therapeutic outcome, rather 
than a single error in logic. Consistently, heuristics are complex decision-making strategies 
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influenced by affects on cognitive processing (Bower, 1981; see also Greenberg and Paivio, 
1997 for the links between cognitive errors and affects).  “Rational” decisions are 
underpinned by affective mood states. Thus far, most empirical research on cognitive errors in 
BPD has failed to fully address this complexity, in particular in regards to change in biased 
thinking over the course of therapy; the present study will not  use the heuristics concepts, but 
is based on the affect-infused cognitive theory (e.g., Bower, 1981) imposing the detailed 
analysis of in-session speech.  
To date, it has been shown that single cognitive errors such as dichotomous thinking – 
or all-or-nothing thinking – were associated with BPD (Napolitano & McKay, 2007; Veen & 
Arntz, 2000). High frequencies of biases, i.e., judging others aggressively and negatively (in 
addition to less positively, compared to controls), were reported elsewhere (Barnow, 
Stopsack, Grabe, Meinke, Spitzer, Kronmüller, & Sieswerda, 2009). Some of these studies 
rely on self-reports. A number of conceptual and methological limitations related to this 
approach need to be taken into account (Kramer, Vaudroz, Ruggeri, & Drapeau, in press), in 
particular when one is interested in the in-session production of cognitive activity potentially 
influenced by affect (e.g., Bower, 1981). Using an observer-rated method to rate in-session 
cognitive activity and thus responding to some of this criticism, Kramer et al. (in press) 
showed that a pattern of negative cognitive errors, fortune-telling and over-generalizing 
together, were related to BPD. The negative valence of a cognitive error, as opposed to its 
positive valence, denotes a bias towards negative evaluation of the self and the other. It is in 
line with the concept of biased thinking itself to assess these in-session processes individually 
and not only conceive and measure them on a general level, as global biases towards the 
negative for example (e.g., Barnow et al., 2009) or as global assessment of cognitive 
flexibility.  
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The aim of the present study was to test the effects of Motive-Oriented Therapeutic 
Relationship on change of in-session cognitive errors, as assessed by a valid oberver-rated 
system with patients presenting with Borderline Personality Disorder. Our hypotheses were 
that: (1) the frequency of cognitive errors (overall score) would decrease over the course of 
10-session psychodynamic-psychiatric treatment for Borderline Personality Disorder; (2) that 
there would be a decrease in the frequency of cognitive errors that is greater in subjects who 
received the Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship, as compared to subjects who 
underwent psychodynamic-psychiatric treatment as usual; and (3) that there would be a 
decrease in cognitive errors that is related to a decrease in symptoms over the course of 10-
session psychodynamic-psychiatric treatment for Borderline Personality Disorder. 
Method 
Design 
The current process-outcome study is based on a randomized controlled trial (RCT), 
published elsewhere (Kramer, Berger et al., 2011). The outcome study involved is a two-
group RCT add-on effectiveness design (group 1: comparison; group 2: comparison plus 
MOTR, hereafter referred to as MOTR) on 10 sessions of an outpatient psychodynamic-
psychiatric treatment. A detailed flow chart of the entire sample of N = 25 patients of the pilot 
study can be found in Kramer, Berger and colleagues (2011, p. 246). One criterion used to 
include a participant was that a sufficient number of therapy sessions were recorded (M = 7.2; 
SD = 1.4; range 4-12), in order to be able to perform analyses based on change over the 
course of the ten-session-treatment. Based on this criterion, no participant needed to be 
excluded. In order to increase feasibility of the current process-outcome study, we randomly 
chose 20 patients from the sample of the pilot study. The participants were chosen irrespective 
of their treatment status (completers or drop-outs). 
Participants 
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Patients 
A total of N = 20 outpatients presenting with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
were included in the study. Eighteen (80%) were female; the patients had a mean age of 32 
years (SD = 12.45; ranging from 19 to 56). All patients were French-speaking and had a 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994) diagnosis of BPD, as diagnosed by the treating clinician using the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-II; First, Spitzer, Williams, & Gibbons, 
2004). The mean number of BPD criteria met was 6.70 (SD = 1.59; ranging between 5 and 9). 
Additional axis II diagnoses included paranoid PD (1 patient) and narcissistic PD (2 patients). 
A trained researcher independently reviewed 20% of the video-taped SCID-II interviews 
(randomly selected) to reassess the diagnosis. Inter-rater reliability for the SCID-II was 
assessed on the item-level using ĸ-statistics; reliability of axis II diagnoses was satisfactory (ĸ 
= .79). Some of the patients (n = 10; 50%) presented co-morbid axis I disorders, such as major 
depression (4 patients; 20%), agoraphobia (1 patient), dysthymia (1 patient), bulimia (1 
patient), anorexia (1 patient), panic disorder (1 patient), alcohol abuse (1 patient), somatoform 
disorder (1 patient), schizoaffective disorder (1 patient). Axis I-diagnoses were obtained using 
the MINI and were only rated for present disorders (Lecrubier et al., 1997); interrater 
agreement was not examined for these diagnoses. Two of the 20 patients (1 per condition) 
received short-term inpatient treatment (i.e., crisis intervention) during the studied time-
frame; 14 patients (7 per condition) had additional psychopharmacological treatment. 
Therapists 
In total, 8 therapists (psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses) participated in the treatment 
of the patients included in the study on the 10-session therapy. Training of the therapists in the 
psychiatric-psychodynamic model proposed by Gunderson and Links (2008; see under 
Treatment conditions) began at the onset of the study and continued over its course. The basic 
training included between 3 and 5 years of training in psychodynamic psychotherapy and 
CHANGE IN BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 13 
psychiatric clinical management, prior to the study. All the therapists were involved in both 
treatment conditions. All treatments were supervised at least twice over the course of the 
treatment process; the first supervision took place after the intake session, the second session 
during the second half of the process. The supervisors were experts in both treatment 
conditions (comparison and MOTR). The therapists received the same amount of supervision 
in both conditions. Therapists treated between 1 and 5 patients, across both conditions: 2 
therapists treated 5 patients each (both therapists had 2 in one condition, 3 in the other), 1 
treated 3 (two in one condition, one in the other), 2 treated 2 (one per condition) and three 
treated 1 each (two in one condition, one in the other); on average (patient per therapist) 2.50; 
SD = 1.58). The therapists were blind to the hypotheses of the study. 
Raters 
 Raters included four Master’s level University students in Clinical Psychology who 
were trained in the use of the CERS measure (see below) according to recent training 
recommendations (Kramer, de Roten, & Drapeau, 2011). The training took place over six 
months and included rating 13 cases (not included in this study), followed by ongoing 
recalibration and supervision with the first author. Such an in-depth training was necessary, 
aiming at avoiding confusion between categories in cases of statements which could 
potentially be interpreted in multiple ways and aiming at highest quality of assessment of 
individual cognitive errors. The raters were blind to the treatment condition and the study 
hypotheses. The independent variable of interest being a subtle one (MOTR), it was almost 
impossible for a student rater not trained in the MOTR-concept to differentiate the two 
conditions. 
Treatment conditions 
Condition 1: comparison group 
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The 10-sessions treatment included weekly psychiatric sessions based on the manual 
by Gunderson and Links (2008). This treatment has been shown to be equally effective as 
Dialectical-Behavior Therapy in a study on a 1-year treatment period (McMain, Links, Gnam, 
Guimond, Cardish, Korman, & Streiner, 2009) and on two-year Follow-up (McMain, 
Guimond, Streiner, Cardish, & Links, 2012). The principle-based manual was adapted to the 
first 10 sessions of the therapy, in particular by proposing at the outset of the intervention a 
specific treatment contract encompassing only 10 sessions for all patients; all further therapy 
was to be discussed based on the clarified clinical indication at the very last interview. The 
10-sessions treatment included the following: (1) the establishment of a reliable clinical 
diagnosis, including co-morbidities and specific problem areas and the communication of this 
diagnosis to the patient; (2) a psychiatric anamnesis; (3) a focus on the main problem(s) to be 
treated; (4) a global enhancement of motivation for long-term treatment and elaboration of 
short-term objectives; (5) the treatment of therapy-interfering problems; and (6) the 
formulation of relational interpretations of core conflictual themes. If necessary, short-term 
inpatient treatment or pharmacotherapy were provided. No adherence checks were performed 
specifically on the variables related to Gunderson and Link’s manual (2008). If clinically 
indicated, all patients received therapy beyond the 10 sessions; however, this study did not 
focus on those subsequent therapy sessions. 
Condition 2: MOTR 
 The MOTR condition differs from the comparison condition in that a Plan Analysis 
and the ensuing Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship were used, in addition to the 
treatment described under condition 1. The total duration, the contents and therapeutic 
objectives of the MOTR-treatment were the same as the comparison treatment; the MOTR-
principle was an integral part of the early therapy process (sessions 2 to 10) and no sessions 
were added. MOTR was implemented after session 1; the intake session gave the therapist the 
CHANGE IN BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 15 
material needed to build a case formulation according the Plan Analysis/MOTR procedures 
(Caspar, 2007).  
Adherence to MOTR in the MOTR-condition vs non-adherence to MOTR in the control group 
Independent adherence controls were done on both treatment groups, in order to 
ensure that the therapists in the MOTR-group were implementing the MOTR-principle to a 
sufficient extent and in parallel, to ensure that the therapists in the comparison condition did 
not do so. Detailed adherence results on the MOTR-scale were presented by Kramer, Berger 
and colleagues (2011) on the same data set as in the present process study, along with 
reliability checks for these adherence ratings, using blind raters for the latter (for the 
procedure, see Caspar and Grosse Holtforth, 2009; Kramer, Berger, & Caspar, 2009). In order 
to do so, a validated observer-rated scale was used assessing therapist in-session behavior 
consistent with MOTR which is the idiographic method of assessing Plan structure and 
MOTR from an independent research perspective (Caspar et al., 2005). On average, MOTR 
was implemented in the MOTR-condition (Mean = 2.09; SD = 0.41, range: 1.12 - 2.54; cut-
off being at 1; range of the 7-point MOTR-scale between -3 and 3) and MOTR was not 
implemented in the comparison condition (Mean = 0.25; SD = .23; range: - 1.98 – 0.94; cut-
off being 1; Kramer, Berger, et al., 2011). According to these results, it can be concluded that 
adherence to MOTR was sufficient in the MOTR-condition (above the cut-off of 1), whereas 
adherence to MOTR was, as expected, under the cut-off in the comparison condition. Thus, 
no cases needed to be excluded from the treatment protocol based on the MOTR-adherence 
ratings and we can confidently exclude potential spill-over effects from one condition to the 
other; we can also confidently exclude spontaneous implementation of MOTR in the 
comparison group and insufficient implementation of MOTR in the MOTR-condition. 
Instruments 
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Cognitive Errors Rating Scale (CERS; Drapeau, Perry, & Dunkley, 2008; French 
translation and validation by Kramer & Drapeau, 2011). The CERS is an observer rating 
system assessing cognitive errors in interview transcripts. It includes 15 different cognitive 
errors, based on J. Beck (1995) and A. T. Beck‘s (1963) work: (1) Fortune-telling, (2) 
Labeling, (3) Over-generalizing, (4) All-or-nothing, (5) Discounting the positive/negative, (6) 
Emotional reasoning, (7) Magnification/minimization of positive/negative, (8) Mental filter, 
(9) Should and must, (10) Tunnel vision, (11) Jumping to conclusions, (12) Mind-reading, 
(13) Personalization, (14) Inappropriate blaming of self, and (15) Inappropriate blaming of 
others. All errors are rated according to their valence: positive and negative. According to 
Lefebvre (1981), they can be classified in four higher-order categories: fortune-telling (error 
1), overgeneralizing (errors 2 and 3), selective abstraction (errors 4 through 11) and 
personalization (errors 12 through 15). For all computations, relative frequencies are used, by 
weighting the absolute frequency of each error by the number of words spoken by the patient 
(excluding therapist interventions and patient hesitations) yielding a score for each error per 
1000 words. Empirical validation data was presented in several studies, accounting for 
sufficient internal and external validity both for the original English version (D’Iuso, Blake, 
Fitzpatrick, & Drapeau, 2009; Drapeau, Blake, & Dobson, 2011) and for the French version 
used in this study (Kramer, Bodenmann, & Drapeau, 2009; Kramer & Drapeau, 2011; 
Kramer, de Roten, & Drapeau, 2011). A manual (Drapeau, Perry, & Dunkley, 2008) guides 
the rater, in order to assure high quality ratings, in particular with regards to typical statements 
which could be confounded between categories. For example, in order to be able to identify a 
Cognitive Error (CE) on a specific transcript excerpt, the rater must find evidence elsewhere 
in the same session. For the current study, reliability coefficients were calculated on 32% (13 
of 40 sessions) of the ratings; interrater reliability was satisfactory with intra-class correlation 
coefficients (ICC(2, 1); Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) varying between .66 and .95 (M = .83; SD = 
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.11). These coefficients are established on higher-order categories per error valence as the unit 
of analysis (8 categories); in order to increase power, for the presentation of the results, only 
the four higher-order categories, broken down into both valences, were examined. 
Outcome Questionnaire-45.2 (OQ-45; Lambert, Burlingame, Umphress, Hansen, 
Vermeersch, Clouse, & Yanchar, 1996). This self-report questionnaire includes 45 items 
addressing three main domains of distress: level of symptoms, interpersonal relations and 
social role. A general sum score was computed for this study. A Likert-type scale is used to 
assess the items, from 0 (never) to 4 (almost all the time). Validation coefficients of the 
original English version are satisfactory, in particular for internal consistency and sensitivity 
to change over psychotherapeutic treatment (Vermeersch, Lambert, & Burlingame, 2000). 
The validation of the French version used in this study was carried out by Emond, Savard, 
Lalande, Boisvert, Boutin, and Simard (2004) and yielded satisfactory results. Cronbach’s 
alpha for this sample was .93. This questionnaire was given at intake and at discharge (after 
session 10) of treatment.  
Procedure 
 All therapy interviews were video- or audio-recorded. The intake interview was 
chosen to be included in the present study for all treatments, as for this intake interview, the 
Plan Analysis and Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship-procedure was not applied yet, 
it was applied only from session 2 onward and the intake session served as baseline 
information; therefore, no between-group difference was assumed for the intake session. Of 
the remaining sessions, the penultimate session was chosen for analysis. These two interviews 
were transcribed verbatim by Master-level psychology students, using the rules defined by 
Mergenthaler and Stigler (1997).  
Interviews were rated using the transcripts. All ratings were done by the same four-
Master level students in psychology. 
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Data Analysis 
As preliminary analyses, we first tested the comparability of both groups at intake 
interview on various variables, such as socio-demographic variables, gender and age, and 
variables related to symptomatic variables, the OQ-45 and the number of presenting BPD-
criteria on the SCID-II, in-session production of number of words and frequencies of 
cognitive errors at baseline. This was done using Wilcoxon’s non-parametric testing and t-
tests, where appropriate. Hypothesis (1) stated a decrease of CEs over the course of the 10-
sessions treatment; paired-sample t-tests were performed comparing frequencies of CEs at 
intake sessions with the frequencies of CEs from the penultimate session. Hypothesis (2) 
stated a greater decrease in CEs in the MOTR: a set of t-tests were performed comparing 
change (residual gains) between the MOTR- and the comparison-condition with regards to the 
frequency of CEs (partialling out the frequency of CEs at intake). For all between-group 
comparisons, we applied Bonferroni’s correction and divided the p-value by 10 (number of 
tests applied). We also tested the potential effect of the presence of medication on change in 
cognitive change; no effect was found. Therefore, this variable was not included in any of the 
statistical analyses. Hypothesis (3) stated a link between the decrease in CEs and symptom 
decrease: Pearson’s correlations were used to test this hypothesis (N = 20). 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
 First, socio-demographic variables, as well as symptomatic variables, and the number 
of presenting BPD-criteria on the SCID-II (First et al., 2004), were examined for possible 
between-group differences (MOTR vs. comparison). Results showed no significant difference 
on any of these variables. Next, we conducted similar analyses on the baseline profile of 
cognitive errors with regard to possible between-group differences (MOTR vs. comparison; 
see Table 1). Again, we did not find any significant between-group differences. Finally, no 
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between-group differences were found with regard to the frequency of inpatient treatment 
during the study period nor with regard to the medication. Both groups may therefore be 
considered comparable at baseline on these variables.  
 According to Kramer, Berger and colleagues (2011), MOTR may have an impact on 
therapeutic outcome (measured using the OQ-45) in the early-phase of treatment (see above). 
For the sub-sample used in the present study we found a significant difference favoring 
MOTR with regard to symptom reduction over the course of the 10-sessions-treatment (F(1, 
18) = 4.47; p = .05; d = .91), when comparing residual gains of the OQ-45 (total score) 
between both groups (MOTR vs. comparison). 
Change in Cognitive Errors over the course of 10-session Treatment 
 For our first hypothesis (both conditions together), it can be said that the frequency of 
cognitive errors, assessed on the process level, diminished over the course of the ten-session 
treatment (t(1, 19) = 2.22; p = .05; d = .66), especially negatively valenced errors (t(1, 19) = 
2.82; p = .04; d = .84; see Table 2). More specifically, there were two categories of cognitive 
errors which decreased over the course of treatment: the negatively-valenced fortune-telling, 
also called catastrophizing (t(1, 19) = 2.91; p = .04; d = .72) and the negatively valenced over-
generalizing (t(1, 19) = 3.35; p = .03; d = 1.01). All other categories remained unchanged, 
with small to medium effect sizes.  
Effects of Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship on Change in Cognitive Errors 
 For our second hypothesis, when comparing the MOTR- with the comparison 
condition, one significant effect was found: MOTR produced a higher decrease in the use of 
negatively-valenced over-generalizing (t(1, 18) = 3.24; p = .03; d = 1.45; see Table 3). For all 
the other categories, there was no between-group difference. In order to illustrate the results, 
we cite several excerpts from the present study which were rated as negative over-
generalizing, according to the manual by Drapeau and colleagues (2008). For example, a 
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female patient said “I’ve always been a disatisfied person” which was rated as negative 
labeling (as part of the over-generalizing CE cluster). Another female patient expressed that 
“Everybody makes negative comments on others”, rated as negative over-generalizing. Both 
individuals made sweeping negative conclusions as regards the self or the others, which go 
beyond the description of a situation. 
Links between cognitive change and symptom change 
 For our third hypothesis, Pearson’s correlations revealed significant correlations 
between cognitive change and symptom change (all positive correlations meaning that greater 
decrease in cognitive errors is associated with decrease in symptoms, and vice-versa): 
symptom change (change on total score on OQ-45) was related to change in total CE (r = .44, 
p = .05; r partial = .38, p = .08, when controlled for total symptom level at intake), to change in 
negative CEs (r = .46, p = .04; r partial = .38, p = .08) and to change in negative over-
generalizing (r = .49, p = .03, r partial = .38, p = .08). Because Kramer, Berger and colleagues 
(2011) found a specific effect of MOTR on decrease in the OQ’s interpersonal problems sub-
scale, we tested this sub-scale in this study as well. Change on sub-score interpersonal 
problems (on OQ-45) was related to change in total CEs (r = .55, p = .01; r partial = .52, p = 
.02, when controlled for interpersonal problems at intake), to change in negative CEs (r = .58, 
p = .01; r partial = .55, p = .01), and to change in negative over-generalizing (r = .49, p = .03; r 
partial = .44, p = .05), selective abstraction (r = .52, p = .02; r partial = .52, p = .02) and 
personalizing (r = .49, p = .03; r partial = .45, p = .05). No other change in cognitive errors was 
correlated with symptom change. 
Discussion 
This exploratory study aimed to determine whether a Motive-Oriented Therapeutic 
Relationship (MOTR), based on Plan Analysis, produced an additional decrease in biased 
thinking over the course of ten-session psychodynamic-psychiatric treatment for patients with 
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Borderline Personality Disorder. This first hypothesis was confirmed: both overall cognitive 
errors and some specific categories of negative cognitive errors, in particular fortune-telling 
and over-generalizing, decreased, with large effect sizes. Links with outcome, which tend to 
be maintained when we control for symptom severity at intake, speaks to the importance of 
these observations. No significant effect was found for positive cognitive errors. This result is 
in line with previous studies on cognitive errors, showing that negatively valenced errors 
change more rapidly compared to the positively valenced errors (Kendall & Hollon, 1981; 
Schwartz, 1986). It is also noteworthy that a psychodynamically-oriented treatment produces 
change on cognitive variables. Somewhat comparable results were reported by Connolly 
Gibbons and colleagues (2009) in a questionnaire-based study of the cognitive variable view 
of self (N = 411) which predicted outcome in both psychodynamic and cognitive 
psychotherapies. The decrease in negative cognitions over the course of psychodynamically-
oriented treatments suggests a possible overall mechanism of change in psychotherapy. 
Furthermore, we aimed to determine if Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship 
(MOTR) has an additional impact on change in cognitive errors over the course of a 
psychiatric-psychodynamic treatment for Borderline Personality Disorder. Results partially 
supported our hypothesis that MOTR decreases the frequency of in-session production of 
CEs. This hypothesis only held true for negative over-generalizing; no between-group effect 
was found for the overall scores on cognitive errors. Even if this result was obtained on a 
sample with limited power, it appears that MOTR likely has an added effect on the decrease 
in negative over-generalizing in the early phase of treatment for BPD. If this effect is 
confirmed on larger samples, it may be concluded that individualized, implicit-relational 
intervention principles focusing on the in-session reassurance of the patient’s motives not 
only produce better outcomes, but also have an impact on cognitive processing of relevant 
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content and as potential mechanism of change influence indirectly the quality of the 
therapeutic process, relationship and outcome.  
The pervasiveness of the cognitive assumptions characterized with negative over-
generalizing, e.g., “I’ve always been a disatisfied person”, may decrease over the course of 
treatment infused by an individualized corrective relational experience with the therapist. In 
this example, the therapist using the MOTR principle may understand this patient utterance 
according to the underlying sequence of Plans: “convince the therapist that you have always 
been in a difficult situation”, or, also, “show to the therapist that you have high expectations”, 
which may, in turn, serve the purpose of “show that you are in an impasse”, then serving the 
purpose of “make sure the therapist fully engages in the therapeutic relationship” and, finally, 
“avoid losing the other” and “increase control over your life” as motives or psychological 
needs. Reassuring these motives, in particular as a therapist showing that he/she engages fully 
in therapy with this patient, should decrease underlying convictions, such as the one cited 
earlier (i.e., “I’ve always been a disatisfied person”). On a non-verbal level, this therapist can 
express genuine interest for the patient, reassuring competence and reassuring presence within 
the therapeutic contract; on a verbal level, he can convey that the patient has taken an 
important step when coming to therapy, that he/she is at the right place and that the therapist 
will do everything possible to help the patient. The fact that only one CE-category decreased 
over the course of the 10-session treatment associated with MOTR - negative 
overgeneralizing – speaks to a specific effect. Increased frequency of this particular category 
was related to BPD in earlier studies (Kramer, Vaudroz et al., in press); MOTR addresses and 
changes the core maladaptive cognitive process in this pathology. 
There are a number of limitations to the present exploratory process-outcome study. 
We assessed single cognitive errors, whereas from the perspective of maladaptive heuristics 
(Dimaggio et al., 2006), changes in patterns of biased cognitive activity are postulated, such 
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as “better safe than sorry”. From this perspective, sequential patterns based on the in-session 
occurrence of the cognitive errors should be taken into account, which would also inform 
more profoundly on the exact processes of change, from the patient perspective, associated 
with the MOTR-intervention. Without this information, we do not actually know if cognitive 
change observed is due to the presumed implicit-relational corrective experience associated 
with MOTR or some other (uncontrolled) process. For example, processes in the two 
conditions may have been affected differentially by the use of medication; even if no main 
effect was found, we did not control for interaction effects. We fundamentally assumed that 
change in cognitive-affective structures (with biased thinking as a marker) functioned as a 
mediator of change in treatments infused by MOTR; we did not test other variables of 
potential interest for the role of mediator. In addition, sample size was an issue. Related to 
this, the number of patients per therapist was small and made it unfeasible to take the therapist 
variable into account. Furthermore, adherence was not rated for the variables related to 
Gunderson and Link’s (2008) manual in both conditions, as our independent variable of 
interest was MOTR. Finally, in accordance with the study’s objectives, we only assessed 10 
sessions, thus, we may not draw conclusions on how these variables behave after this time-
frame.  
Nonetheless, because our methodology was based on in-session speech, we observed 
natural changes in cognitive activity, as they occured spontaneously. Discourse is potentially 
influenced by affective components. The present observer-rated approach assumes there are 
links between in-session cognitive and affective activity in the individual and it does not 
assume an a priori definition of specific cognitive biases to be maladaptive. Cognitive biases 
may indeed be understood as adaptive in some specific situations and maladaptive in others, 
as they are part of complex, multi-stage strategies to make decisions, to regulate emotions, to 
orient behavior and to adapt to external and internal constraints. We assumed a the deficit-
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definition of cognitive errors and found a decrease in CEs as a result of treatment and a 
specific adding effect of implicit corrective-relational interventions based on individualized 
proactive need satisfaction and resource-orientation. 
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Table 1 
Sociodemographic characteristics and frequencies of Cognitive Errors at intake, as function of 
group (N = 20) 
Cognitive Errors COMP MOTR U/t p 
M SD M SD 
Socio-demographics 
  Gender (% Female) 
  Age 
Medication (% use) 
Inpatient (% use) 
OQ-45 total 
  -Symptoms 
  -Interpersonal problems 
  -Social role 
  Number BPD 
Cognitive errors 
  Number of words 
Cognitive errors total 
  -Positive 
  -Negative 
Positive cognitive errors 
  -Fortune-Telling 
  -Over-Generalizing 
  -Selective Abstraction 
  -Personalization 
 
80 
29.70 
70 
10 
92.80 
54.30 
23.00 
15.50 
6.60 
 
4583.50 
1.65 
.48 
1.17 
 
.00 
.00 
.44 
.04 
 
 
13.73 
 
 
16.45 
13.12 
3.02 
4.65 
1.58 
 
612.98 
.92 
.40 
.92 
 
.00 
.00 
.40 
.09 
 
80 
34.30 
70 
10 
87.70 
49.80 
22.00 
15.90 
6.90 
 
4812.70 
2.13 
.58 
1.55 
 
.00 
.04 
.53 
.00 
 
 
11.26 
 
 
26.65 
17.96 
5.03 
5.23 
1.66 
 
1725.58 
1.58 
.78 
1.69 
 
.00 
.09 
.79 
.00 
 
50.00a 
-.82b 
50.00 a 
50.00 a 
.52b 
.64b 
.54b 
-.18b 
-.55b 
 
-.40b 
-.84b 
-.36b 
-.64b 
 
n.a. 
-1.47b 
-.35b 
1.50b 
 
1.00 
.42 
1.00 
1.00 
.61 
.53 
.60 
.86 
.58 
 
.70 
.41 
.72 
.53 
 
n.a. 
.16 
.73 
.15 
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Negative cognitive errors 
  -Fortune-Telling 
  -Over-Generalizing 
  -Selective Abstraction 
  -Personalization 
 
.22 
.32 
.52 
.11 
 
.19 
.34 
.49 
.23 
 
.12 
.57 
.70 
.21 
 
.23 
.71 
.43 
.56 
 
1.09b 
-1.02b 
-.90b 
-.55b 
 
.29 
.32 
.38 
.59 
Note. n.a. not applicable; aWilcoxon’s U; b t-tests; All CE scores are weighted relative 
frequencies per 1000 words. Number BPD: Number of BPD-criteria assessed using SCID-II-
procedure. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 2 
Cognitive Errors at intake and at later session of the 10-session Treatment (N = 20) 
Cognitive Errors Intake Late t ES 
M SD M SD 
Cognitive errors 
  -Positive 
  -Negative 
Positive cognitive errors 
  -Fortune-Telling 
  -Over-Generalizing 
  -Selective Abstraction 
  -Personalization 
Negative cognitive errors 
  -Fortune-Telling 
  -Over-Generalizing 
  -Selective Abstraction 
  -Personalization 
2.19 
.53 
1.66 
 
.00 
.02 
.49 
.02 
 
.17 
.72 
.61 
.16 
1.35 
.61 
1.35 
 
.00 
.07 
.61 
.07 
 
.21 
.64 
.46 
.42 
1.22 
.43 
.79 
 
.00 
.09 
.33 
.01 
 
.05 
.23 
.43 
.08 
.64 
.43 
.58 
 
.00 
.17 
.34 
.05 
 
.11 
.24 
.36 
.21 
3.07* 
.64 
2.82* 
 
n.a. 
-1.65 
1.17 
1.05 
 
2.91* 
3.35* 
1.27 
1.40 
.92 
.19 
.84 
 
n.a. 
.54 
.32 
.16 
 
.72 
1.01 
.44 
.24 
Note. n.a. not applicable; ES: Cohen’s d. Bonferroni’s correction applied (.05/10) 
* p < .05/10 
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Table 3 
Change in Cognitive Errors, partialling out initial frequency levels, as a function of group 
Cognitive Errors COMP (N = 10) MOTR (N = 10) t ES 
M SD M SD 
Cognitive errors 
  -Positive 
  -Negative 
Positive cognitive errors 
  -Fortune-Telling 
  -Over-Generalizing 
  -Selective Abstraction 
  -Personalization 
Negative cognitive errors 
  -Fortune-Telling 
  -Over-Generalizing 
  -Selective Abstraction 
  -Personalization 
-.52 
-.10 
-.42 
 
0.00 
.09 
-.18 
-.02 
 
-.17 
-.10 
-.10 
-.05 
1.05 
.43 
1.17 
 
0.00 
.13 
.32 
.07 
 
.18 
.42 
.68 
.23 
-.81 
-.09 
-.72 
 
0.00 
.04 
-.13 
.00 
 
-.08 
-.87 
-.27 
-.10 
1.63 
.89 
1.56 
 
0.00 
.21 
.77 
.00 
 
.19 
.62 
.66 
.26 
.47 
-.05 
.49 
 
n.a. 
.72 
-.19 
-1.06 
 
-1.10 
3.24* 
.58 
.49 
.21 
.01 
.22 
 
n.a. 
.29 
.08 
.40 
 
.01 
1.45 
.25 
.20 
Note. n.a. not applicable. ES: Cohen’s d. All CE scores represent change scores; negative 
scores represent decrease of the frequency of CE. All CE scores are weighted relative 
frequencies per 1000 words per session. Bonferroni’s correction applied (.05/10) 
* p < .05/10 
